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During the Illinois General Assembly’s January 2013 
special session a proposal to limit the so-called Cost of 
Living Adjustments (COLAs), a component of public 
employee pensions, was much discussed and debated. 
Under current pension rules many state workers and 
retirees have been promised that the pension benefits 
they receive will rise by 3 percent per year. 
This benefit is often described as a COLA but, in fact, is 
unrelated to the cost of living or inflation and is more 
properly termed an “escalator” clause. The value of this 
escalator clause to the pension recipient can be quite 
substantial. A pension of $50,000 in 2013 would grow by 
75 percent to more than $87,000 by 2033 under the current 
escalator clause. Depending on the rate of inflation during 
this period, the purchasing power of the pension might 
either increase or decrease.
Those in the General Assembly working on pension reform 
have introduced legislative proposals to reduce the value 
of the escalator clause in an attempt to control pension 
costs in the face of large unfunded pension liabilities. One 
proposal would have completely suspended the escalator 
for six years (until 2020) and would have capped the 
pension subject to the escalator clause at $25,000. This 
would have meant that anyone receiving a pension 
of $25,000 or more would have received no increase in 
their pension until 2020 and would have received a flat 
$750 — that is 3 percent of $25,000 — per year thereafter. 
Such legislation would certainly have reduced the value of 
promised pension benefits for many workers and retirees, 
but it is difficult to quantify the exact amount of the 
reduction since it depends on many factors such as the time 
period considered and individuals’ accumulated benefits.
The following analysis demonstrates that:
•	 Proposals	made	in	the	Illinois	General	Assembly	to	limit	the	Cost	of	Living	Adjustments	would	decrease	the	
value	of	public	pensions.
•	 The	simplified	calculations	here	show	that the proposed changes would significantly reduce the value of benefits 
even for claimants with a relatively small pension and a high discount rate. 
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We can compute illustrative estimates of the loss in 
benefits from elimination of the COLA by comparing the 
promised value of pension benefits under the current 
system to the promised value under the proposed system. 
The ratio of the value of benefits under the system with 
the new COLA to the current system is a measure of the 
loss to pension claimants. For example, if a claimant 
would get 75 percent of the promised benefits under 
the new system, the legislation would reduce promised 
pension benefits by 25 percent.
One difficulty in calculating the reduction: because 
benefits occur over time, we need to undertake special 
calculations to summarize their value in a single number. 
Economists and financial analysts routinely use a 
procedure called present value analysis to calculate the 
value of a stream of benefits or costs that occur over 
time.  Present value analysis measures the quantity of 
money an individual would have to receive today (i.e. 
the “present value”) to compensate him or her for the 
loss of a future stream of income.  The present value of 
any stream of income depends upon the individual’s 
rate of time preference or discount rate, i.e. how much 
the individual prefers getting income now compared 
to receiving it in the future. Economists use a variety of 
discount rates depending on the particular circumstances. 
For this analysis I use illustrative discount rates of 2, 3.5 
and 5 percent.  The higher the discount rate the more the 
individual desires to get his or her money sooner.
Figure 1 shows the percentage reduction in pension 
benefits from the proposed change in the escalator clause 
at four pension levels from $25,000 to $100,000 and three 
discount rates for a pension that starts in 2013 and is 
received for 20 years.  The reduction varies from a low of 
about 17 percent for an individual with a pension benefit 
of $25,000 in 2013 and a high discount rate to about 30 
percent for an individual with a pension of $100,000 in 
2013 and a low discount rate1. 
These calculations show that the proposed changes 
would significantly reduce the value of benefits even 
for claimants with a relatively small pension and a high 
discount rate. The percentage reductions in benefits are 
greater for workers with a high pension than for those with 
lower pensions but this does not necessarily mean that 
high income households bear a more than proportionate 
share of the burden since some high income workers will 
receive a relatively small pension because they have few 
years of state service.
While these calculations make clear that the proposed 
changes would impose a significant burden on some 
state workers, the calculations alone cannot determine 
whether the proposed change in the escalator clause is 
appropriate.  Dealing with Illinois’ unfunded pension 
liabilities will require imposing significant burdens 
on some individuals.  It is hoped that the calculations 
contained in this document may promote a better 
understanding of this particular policy proposal and be 
one factor legislators and others consider when deciding 
how to deal with Illinois’ pension challenges.
1 These calculations implicitly assume no survivor benefits and are 
simplified in a number of ways.  The calculations should be thought 
of as illustrative estimates of the order of magnitude of the proposed 
change rather than as precise estimates of the loss of benefits to 
the individual.  The percentage reduction in benefits is relatively 
insensitive to the choice of discount rate.  For example, if the discount 
rate were zero, reductions in benefits would vary from 20 to 33 percent 
depending on income.  If the discount rate were 10, percent reductions 
in benefits would vary from 14 to 21 percent.
Figure 1: Percentage reduction in value of pension benefit as a 
function of discount rate and initial pension benefit
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